2020年11月27日，在Halliburton Company v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd (Formerly known as Ace Bermuda Insurance Ltd) [2020] UKSC 48一案中，英国最高法院在审理该案的最终上诉时指出，在仲裁员不存在偏见的现实可能性时，关联案件中仲裁员的保密义务优先于披露义务，理由是此时不进行披露不一定损害其公正性，但若进行披露则会有损其对后案的保密义务，而仲裁员只有获得后案当事人的许可时才得在前案中披露后案的情况。
一、背景介绍
Transocean Holdings LLC是Deepwater Horizon钻机的所有人，英国石油公司是位于墨西哥湾的Deepwater Horizon钻机的承租人，Transocean Holdings LLC向英国石油公司提供了船员和钻井队。上诉人Halliburton公司为英国石油公司在墨西哥湾提供固井和井眼监测服务，Halliburton与TransoceanLtd公司二者之间的服务内容有所重叠，而且上诉人与Transocean Ltd公司都分别向被上诉人Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd（改名前为Ace Bermuda Insurance Ltd）进行投保。
Deepwater Horizon钻机在2010年时发生爆炸和火灾，此后英国石油公司、上诉人和Transocean成为多起民事诉讼的被告，并且英国石油公司还对上诉人和Transocean提起诉讼。在其中诉讼案件中，美国法院判决各方分摊责任，而上诉人达成了和解协议，对其赔偿损害金额进行约定，并试图根据其保单主张一部分和解金但被被上诉人拒绝，因此上诉人提起仲裁。双方各自任命其边裁后无法对首席仲裁员人选达成一致，进而申请英格兰高等法院作出决定，而法院任命了被上诉人的第一提名人选Rokison先生。
上诉人事后在2016年发现，Rokison先生在接受任命之后，在上诉人不知情的情况下又在另外两个与Deepwater Horizon钻机事件有关的仲裁案件中被任命为仲裁员，一企为Transocean Holdings LLC对被上诉人提起的仲裁，另一企为Transocean Holdings LLC与其他公司联合对另一家保险公司对提起的仲裁。
上诉人之后向该首席仲裁员发函质疑其公正性以及其未披露在Transocean等案件的任职情况，并建议其自动辞职，但该仲裁员回复认为并不存在任何使其丧失公正性的情况，但认可其本应审慎披露该等任命，并在得到被上诉人同意后辞职，但随后被上诉人撤回同意。
2016年12月，上诉人依照1996《仲裁法》第24条，以存在当事人对该仲裁员的公正性产生具有合理怀疑的事由为理由，向高等法院申请罢免Rokison先生的仲裁员职位，该申请被驳回。随后上诉人不服，向高等法院继续上诉，但上诉法院驳回上诉，维持原判（参见20180426仲裁早新闻：仲裁员的披露义务和挑战仲裁员）。随后该案被上诉至英国最高院。
二、法院认定
1、本案的法律难点
1.对于涉及相同标的物的多个关联仲裁案件，其中某当事人均为一方当事人，但另一方当事人则各案各不相同，则仲裁员是否可以，以及在什么程度上可在这些案件中担任仲裁员而不产生偏见和利益冲突？
2.若仲裁员这些案件中担任仲裁员，则其在多大程度上可以不将其在某些案件中担任仲裁员的事实在另一些案件中进行披露，而在什么条件下仲裁员必须披露？
3.若仲裁员未披露上述情形，则将面临什么后果？
由于仲裁员的披露义务属于法定义务，涉案仲裁员并未进行披露，涉嫌违反其披露义务，因此存在实际偏见的合理可能性。然而，该仲裁员对后案同时负有保密义务，因此二义务之间存在冲突。
2、判决理由
最高法院指出，在英格兰法中，仲裁员必须具备公正性，而对于仲裁员明显偏见的检验标准是公正和知情的观察员是否会得出结论认为确实存在偏见的可能性。同时，最高法院认为适用该客观标准时也需要考虑国际仲裁的特殊性，特别是其私密性。
仲裁员的披露义务和仲裁的保密性之间存在一定的冲突。最高法院在研究了仲裁业界的习惯之后指出，依照英格兰法，仲裁员的披露义务是仲裁员公正义务的组成部分，但披露义务并不凌驾于仲裁员的保密性和仲裁员的保密义务之上。因此，若仲裁员对于其需要披露的信息若负有保密义务，则其只有在其获得权利人的明示或默示同意（例如根据仲裁业界的习惯从仲裁协议中推断出）的前提下才得披露该等信息（This current practice of arbitrators in English-seated arbitrations vouches two things. First, as a general rule the duty of privacy and confidentiality is not understood to prohibit all forms of disclosure of the existence of a related arbitration in the absence of express consent. Secondly, the duty of disclosure does not give an arbitrator carte blanche to disclose whatever is necessary to persuade a party that there is no justification for doubts about his or her impartiality. There will be many matters which cannot be disclosed without the express consent of the parties to that arbitration.）。此外，仲裁员未能披露有关事项只是公正知情的观察者在评估该仲裁员是否存在偏见的现实可能时的考虑因素之一，但不是全部。
公正知情的观察者在评估仲裁员是否履行披露义务时需考虑披露义务产生之时和之后的事实和情形（A court when later assessing whether there should have been disclosure must have regard to the circumstances prevailing at the time when the arbitrator acquired the requisite knowledge of those circumstances and disregard matters of which the arbitrator could not have known at that time.）最高法院指出，仲裁员是否应进行披露的问题不应依照公正知情的观察者事后才知道的情形来溯及既往地进行评估（The question whether there should have been disclosure should not be answered retrospectively by reference to matters known to the fair-minded and informed observer only at a later date.）。在评估仲裁员是否有存在偏见的现实能性时，公正知情的观察者则需考虑仲裁员回避的听证会时已知的事实和情形（In the present appeal the Court of Appeal was correct in para 95 of its judgment to apply the test for apparent bias by asking whether “at the time of the hearing to remove” the circumstances would have led the fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was in fact a real possibility of bias.）。
最高法院认为，根据本案一审庭审之日已知的情况，公正知情的观察者并不一定能从涉案仲裁员未披露其另案担任仲裁员这一情形而推断出存在偏见的现实可能性（Having regard to the circumstances known to the court at the date of the hearing at first instance, I am not persuaded that the fair-minded and informed observer would infer from the oversight that there was a real possibility of unconscious bias on Mr Rokison’s part.），理由是当时尚不清楚该仲裁员在法律上是否负有披露义务；而且涉及Chubb和Transocean的仲裁案是在本案开始仲裁之后几个月才开始；而涉案仲裁员对于上诉人对其的质疑做出了适当回应——其在该案的任命会作为该案的初步问题来得到妥善处理，否则其将考虑在该案中辞职，因此被上诉人并无法从其在该案中也担任仲裁员获益。此外，该仲裁员并未接受任何秘密经济利益，而且也无法从该仲裁员接受两个后案的仲裁员任命这点推测其潜意识中居心不良。（First, there appears to have been a lack of clarity in English case law as to whether there was a legal duty of disclosure and whether disclosure was needed; that can be seen from the judgment at first instance of the able and experienced commercial judge. Secondly, the time sequence of the three references may explain why Mr Rokison saw the need to disclose reference 1 to Transocean but did not identify the need to tell Halliburton about reference 2. Thirdly, his measured response to Halliburton’s robust challenge disclosed that it was likely that references 2 and 3 would be resolved by the preliminary issue and that there would not be any overlap in evidence or legal submissions between them and reference 1. As the arbitral tribunal had held hearings on the preliminary issues in November 2016, Mr Rokison would have been aware of its likely decision when he corresponded with K & L Gates in December 2016 and January 2017 (paras 19- 22 above). Indeed, the awards handed down on 1 March 2017 revealed that his discreet prediction was correct. If that had not been the outcome of the preliminary issues, he had also offered to consider resigning from his appointments in references 2 and 3. As a result of Mr Rokison’s response, there was no likelihood of Chubb gaining any advantage by reason of the overlapping references. Fourthly, there is no question of Mr Rokison having received any secret financial benefit in this case; if that objection were valid it would mean that every party-appointed arbitrator receives a disqualifying benefit. In this regard I agree with the Court of Appeal in para 82 of its judgment and with Popplewell J in para 20 of his judgment. Fifthly, I am satisfied that there is no basis for inferring unconscious bias in the form of subconscious ill-will in response to the robustness of the challenge which K & L Gates mounted on behalf of Halliburton. As Popplewell J stated (in para 56 of his judgment), he responded in a courteous, temperate and fair way and there is no evidence that he bore any animus towards Halliburton as a result.）。
3、Arden勋爵的协同意见
Arden勋爵（LadyArden）在协同意见中指出仲裁员的披露义务是其公正义务的派生义务，是仲裁员的任命的默示条件，在本案的这种情形中仲裁员应认识到其很可能需要披露利益冲突。在仲裁员的披露义务方面，对当事人而言，他们可对主张利益冲突的权利进行弃权；但对仲裁员而言，其一般而言有进行披露的义务，只有在利益冲突不会妨碍仲裁员公正行事的情况下才可以自行决定是否进行披露。然而，在披露义务与保密义务二者之间的关系上，对于本案这种情况而言，若仲裁员对后案情形进行高度披露，则其虽然不违反其对本案和后案中相同的当事人的保密义务，但其若未取得后案当事人的许可则将必然违反对后案的其他当事人的保密义务。
三、评论
本案并非是某一方当事人多次指定某一仲裁员在不同的案件中作为共同仲裁员的情况，而是该名仲裁员在先后进行的存在关联仲裁案件中担任仲裁员的情况，而此时仲裁员是否应将其在后案担任仲裁员的情形披露给前案，则涉及仲裁员的保密义务与披露义务之间的冲突。
最高法院认为，仲裁员违反作为派生义务的披露义务并不导致仲裁员必然违反作为基本义务的公正义务，应适用仲裁员的回避标准审查仲裁员是否有存在偏见的现实可能性，而审查依据是仲裁员回避的听证会时已知的事实和情形。最高法院具体分析了有关的事实和情形之后认为仲裁员的公正性并未受影响，而且其在先案中未披露后案情形是履行其对后案当事人的保密义务。
本案的意义在于明确了在这种情况下的根本判断标准在于仲裁员的公正义务是否受到影响，而此时仲裁员需要根据案件具体情况对其披露义务和保密义务进行权衡，若有关事项并不影响仲裁员的公正性则仲裁员并不需要进行披露。
本案的影响十分深远，对于仲裁员也提出了利益冲突判断的较高要求，这些问题完全需要仲裁员自行把握和判断，。笔者认为，若利益冲突较大时仲裁员应当在后案中辞职，此时需要仲裁员有较高的自觉性。