2020年7月16日，CBX、CBYv CBZ、CCA、CCB [2020] SGHC(I)17一案，当事人以仲裁庭在作出裁决时超越管辖权，未能给申请人提供合理的机会陈述案情，违反新加坡公共政策为由申请撤销加速到期、复利计息以及仲裁费用3个部分仲裁裁决。法院依据禁反言原则，援引仲裁地法律，驳回了申请人的上述请求。
一、案情介绍
2015年6月19日，CBZ与CBX签订第一份买卖合同（CBX SPA），CBZ作为出卖人，将其拥有的AAA公司49%的股权出让给买受人CBX。当日，CBY与CCA、CCB签订了另一份买卖合同（CBY SPA），受让了CCA、CCB持有的AAA公司48.94%的股权。判决中将上述两份合同统称为SPAs。
基于各自的股权架构，最终CC先生为CBX、CBY的实际控制人，DD先生为CBZ、CCA、CCB的实际控制人。
根据CBXSPA、CBY SPA约定，CBX、CBY应于交易日后60天内分别向CBZ、CCA和CCB支付第一笔分期款项。然而，在实际履行的过程中，CBX并未依约付款，而CBY也推迟了首付款的支付时间。
申请人认为，上述款项支付的延期是由于SPA的缔约目的暂无法预计。SPA下申请人收购AAA股份的前提是其开发项目租用的土地，虽然AAA曾以控股BBB的方式承租该宗地，但由于新的政府命令可能影响宗地承租，因此具有缔约目的无法实现的不确定性。
然而，本案被申请人则认为，就CBYSPA而言，当事人已支付第一笔款项，但并未就其违约支付利息，因此被申请人主张加速到期。就CBX SPA而言，由于CBX并未付款，因此被申请人将其视为已撤销。
2016年1月26日，2016年3月25日，针对以上两方面争议，申请人与被申请人进行了仲裁，后二仲裁合并。
仲裁庭针对上述案件做出了两个阶段裁决，两份裁决虽未撤销SPA，但均对余款支付及复利进行了裁决。2019年8月9日，仲裁庭又对裁决款项做出了裁判，除令申请人向被申请人支付两次仲裁费的66%外，另支持支付单利7.5%。
据此，申请人以仲裁庭在作出裁决时超越管辖权，未能给申请人提供合理的机会陈述案情，违反新加坡公共政策为由，根据《新加坡国际仲裁法》第12条与《示范法》第34条申请撤销加速到期、复利计息以及仲裁费用的部分仲裁裁决。
二、法院认定
1、关于剩余未付款项的裁定
法院从仲裁是否超越管辖权、显失公平及有失公正三个角度对申请人提出的裁决中关于剩余款项支付问题进行论述。
首先，法院认为，关于余款支付是否超越管辖权问题可以直接参见附表5。当事方争议的不仅仅是是否应该加速到期与提供支付担保的问题，双方还有申请人的反请求与抵销方面的问题。（The parties were also arguing about the extent (if at all) to which the Plaintiffs’ counterclaims could be set off against any monies (including the Remaining Amounts) due to the Defendants under the SPAs, regardless of when such monies were payable.）当事人虽未请求追究预期违约与抵销，但不代表上述问题不属于仲裁庭管辖。因此，虽然仲裁庭拒绝了到期付款担保，但其有权依据附表5处理剩余款项的支付问题。（Thus, although it refused security, the Tribunal was entitled to deal with the related question of the timely payment of the Remaining Amounts as per Schedule 5. Given the above, I do not believe that the absence of an allegation of anticipatory breach or of a prayer for declaratory relief, means that timely payment of the Remaining Accounts pursuant to Schedule 5 was outside the Tribunal’s purview in Phase II.）
其次，就显失公平问题而言，法院并未认同申请人主张。法院认为，仲裁庭下发剩余款项支付令并无过错。虽然申请人称其在农用地改革办公室（ALRO）仲裁中的主张与仲裁提到的ALRO问题并不一致，但仲裁庭认为上述两个问题具有因果关系。且CC先生在证据交换结束和最后陈述阶段还有充足的机会提出异议，其本身并没有支付款项的意向，也未提出新的主张，更未陈述其对上诉观点的异议。（From the foregoing survey of events, I do not think that the Tribunal can be faulted for making the Remaining Amounts Orders. There is a mis-match between what the Tribunal was told about the ALRO issue and what the Plaintiffs have claimed in the ALRO arbitration. On the basis of the Plaintiffs' evidence and submissions, the Tribunal would have thought that the ALRO issue and the ALRO arbitration concerned the outcome of the pending new lease application and the consequences of any terms and conditions thereunder. There was nothing to suggest to the Tribunal that, despite CC's re-examination evidence, by the time of the closing exchange and the Post-Hearing Briefs, the Plaintiffs actually had (and still have) no intention of paying the Remaining Amounts in any circumstance. By the Remaining Amounts Orders, the Tribunal was merely acting on its understanding of CC's re-examination evidence as intimated to counsel (and left uncontradicted by the Plaintiffs) during the closing exchange. The Tribunal repeated its understanding in paragraph 312 of its Phase II Partial Awards (quoted in [16] above). The Plaintiffs had ample opportunity before then to disabuse the Tribunal of this understanding (for instance, at the closing exchange or in the Plaintiffs' Post-Hearing Reply), but did not do so.）
法院认为，如果仲裁中存在争议，则有关该问题的论点应该在仲裁阶段被提出。当事人在仲裁阶段并未提出上述抗辩，而在庭后援引其他救济途径提出抗辩不能被允许。本案申请人本来可以向仲裁庭示明余款支付案件的真实情况，但实际上申请人并未这么做。所以，法院并不认为这种显失公平归因于仲裁庭，相反法院认为出现上述情况的过错在申请人。（A party cannot keep arguments up its sleeve for use in other proceedings depending on the outcome of the instant arbitration. The rationale for such principle is a salutary one … Here, the Plaintiffs could have (but did not) say anything to the Tribunal about the real nature of their case on the payment of the Remaining Amounts under the SPAs. If as a result they are estopped from raising their case in the ALRO arbitration (for example, if the tribunal in the ALRO arbitration finds that the matter is res judicata), I do not think that such prejudice can be attributed to the Tribunal. The Plaintiffs would only have themselves to blame.）因此，法院称其没有必要再去审理一个已经弃权的主张。（given the conclusions that I have reached on prejudice, it is unnecessary for me to rule on waiver.）
再次，基于以上原因，法院认为在仲裁阶段，申请人有充足的机会对余款支付问题提出异议，但实际上其并未这么做，因此法院不认为裁决有失公正。（As mentioned at [35] above, the Tribunal afforded the Plaintiffs with numerous opportunities to state the true nature of their case on the payment of the Remaining Amounts. The difficulty is that the Plaintiffs did not do so. I therefore disagree that there has been a denial of natural justice.）
综上所述，法院并未支持申请人针对支付余款方面的撤销裁决主张。
2、关于复利计算的裁定
法院从仲裁是否超越管辖权、有失公正以及裁决违背新加坡公共政策三个角度对当事人的请求进行论述。
法院认为，仲裁庭就复利的裁判并未超裁。新加坡是仲裁阶段的仲裁地，仲裁庭的管辖权理应受新加坡法的管辖。《新加坡国际仲裁法》第12条规定仲裁庭有权裁决复利。（I do not agree that the Tribunal lacked power to award compound interest or exceeded its jurisdiction in so doing. Singapore being the seat of the CBX and CBY arbitrations, Singapore law governed the arbitrations (including the extent of the Tribunal's powers). The Tribunal had the power to award compound interest under section 12 of the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (“IAA”)）
法院进而对申请人主张的仲裁有失公正问题进行了论述，认为仲裁庭已给予当事人充足的机会陈述观点，且当事人在第二阶段仲裁过程中提交了大量证据，但是上述证据并未被仲裁庭采纳，相反，仲裁庭支持了复利并进行了裁决。（Nor do I accept that the Plaintiffs were denied a reasonable opportunity to present their case on compound interest under Thai law. On the contrary, in the course of Phase II, the Plaintiffs submitted substantial expert evidence of their case on compound interest in Thai law and managed to persuade the Defendants' expert of the correctness of their view on the issue. On its part, the Tribunal (as confirmed by the Correction Decision) considered the issue of compound interest, including the Thai law material before it. The problem was not so much a lack of due process, as of the Tribunal misapprehending the parties' stances and the thrust of Thai law evidence presented to it.）
法院亦未支持当事人关于裁决违反新加坡公共政策的主张。法院认为根据《新加坡国际仲裁法》第12条5款和第20条的规定，仲裁庭裁决复利本身不违反新加坡的公共政策。（The awarding of compound interest could not by itself be against Singapore public policy since ss 12(5) and 20 of the IAA authorise tribunals to award compound interest.）
虽然申请人主张执行复利有违泰国的公序良俗，为了国际礼让，新加坡法院应撤销关于复利的裁定。且申请人援引Westacre判例，认为关于复利的规定是“确定无疑的非法”（“palpable and indisputable illegality”），但是法院认为，申请人援引的术语是涉及犯罪性质的合同行为，而本案并无明显迹象表明SPA会引起刑事责任。
就撤销裁决而言。《示范法》中作出撤销仲裁裁决的依据是裁决违反仲裁地的公共政策。“公共政策”一词本身出自《纽约公约》与《示范法》，但是，一个裁决在一个司法管辖区内违反了该地的“公共政策”并不意味着它会违反另一个司法管辖区的“公共政策”。（In a setting aside case under the Model Law, the supervising court of the arbitral seat may set aside an award if it contravenes the public policy of the arbitral seat. In contrast, in an enforcement case under the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) and the Model Law, the enforcing state may refuse to enforce an award which contravenes the public policy of the enforcing state. The Plaintiffs' submission requires me to suppose that a Thai court would not enforce the Compound Interest Orders as a matter of Thai public policy, because the latter orders would be contrary to “public order and good morals” under Thai law. Many jurisdictions have a similar concept of supra “public order” or order public as part of their domestic law. It does not follow that, because an award violates the “public order” of a jurisdiction, the award must automatically be contrary to that jurisdiction's “public policy” in the sense that the expression “public policy” is used in the New York Convention or the Model Law.）
最后，针对申请人的观点，即在泰国执行裁决可能违反公共政策，法院认为，裁决可能在泰国执行，但泰国并非裁决的唯一执行地，当事人可依裁决，在《纽约公约》缔约国范围内申请执行裁决。
综上所述，法院并未支持申请人的主张。
3、关于费用的裁决
由于法院并未支持申请人对于上述两个争议焦点的主张，因此，法院并未支持当事人对仲裁费的异议。
三、案评
禁反言原则，是指当事人在法律程序中不得作出前后矛盾的言词或行为以损害对方当事人的信赖利益。通常情况下，新加坡法律下构成禁反言需要以下四个要件：（1）就争议已存在终局性的和决定性的判决；（2）须由具有管辖权的法院作出；（3）被比较的两项诉讼程序的当事人完全一致；以及（4）两项诉讼程序的标的完全一致。本案法院援引该原则针对了申请人在仲裁中的默示行为。法院认为，一方当事人在仲裁中未就某一观点进行论述，不得在仲裁后援引另一救济途径，申请撤销仲裁裁决。
仲裁庭关于复利的管辖权规定在《新加坡国际仲裁法》第20条，“利息的裁决：（1）除第（3）款另有规定外，除当事方另有约定外，仲裁庭可在仲裁程序中，自仲裁庭认为适当的日期起至全部或部分付款之日止的任何期间里，按仲裁庭认为适当的利率和余额，裁决单利或复利。”（Interest on awards (1) Subject to subsection (3), unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an arbitral tribunal may, in the arbitral proceedings before it, award simple or compound interest from such date, at such rate and with such rest as the arbitral tribunal considers appropriate, for any period ending not later than the date of payment on the whole or any part of.）法院明知裁决的复利与泰国法律相冲突，仍不认为该内容违反公共政策是因为每个国家对公共政策这个术语都有不同见解。正如法官在判决中所言，仲裁裁决在《纽约公约》缔约国范围内均可以被申请承认和执行，当事人可以凭裁决在有另一方当事人财产的其他国家申请执行裁决。